When the authors discuss legitimacy of species-level conservation as “books in a burning library, in a city with an undermanned fire department,” they are noting the conditions involved in tending to various types of threatened and endangered species. There are simply not enough resources to support the wildlife who need them to survive in the context of global warming. The technical legitimacy of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), in terms of number of species recovered through conservation, is a subset of the entire policy’s legitimacy (Czech and Krausman 2001).
The books represent the various gateways to knowledge contained in the library. Czech and Krausman define large books with more information as similar to species with more genetic information and books that took a long time to write are similar to species with slow molecular clocks (2001). From there, conservationists must make a choice about which books to save. The authors suggest the choice needs to be determined by a list, based upon science, that outlines the hierarchy of priority. The burning quality suggests a lack of time to understand the books and rescue them. This is especially true considering that a fire in a room full of papers gets increasingly destructive by the second. So, the library is degrading at a rapid speed. The city suggests a setting filled with people. Typically, cities are also filled with pollution derived from human activity. The library exists in the city and is therefore impacted by its pollution. The library represents a vast ecosystem containing a vast array of life. The fire department’s undermanned quality is contrasted by the plentiful amount of books in the library. That said, the authors emphasize the result is prioritizing some types of species above others as opposed to thoroughly implementation the policy. The theory is, the fire fighters would not need to prioritize so much if the policy design was strong.
Reference:
Czech, Brian and Paul R. Krausman. 2001. The Endangered Species Act: History, Conservation, Biology, and Public Policy. 1st Edition Johns Hopkins University Press.
Comment by Fenton Kay:
Good post, Mary. One short-coming with the library analogy, in my mind, has to do with the proliferation of libraries. What are your thoughts regarding conservation efforts outside the ESA that are perhaps saving many of the books by having them in other libraries?
My Comment:
Hi Fenton,
The question reminds me of our discussion in week two considering the destruction of suitable habitat is a primary factor in the population decline of a species. Efforts to recover a species are far more efficient when its habitat is not degraded. That said, conservation efforts outside the ESA are taking care of their other libraries and are therefore saving many of the books. One solution is creating private landowner interest in market-based incentive programs for endangered species habitat conservation. More than 75% of endangered species in the United States rely on private land for habitat (Rodrigues et al. 2011). Although this habitat has long been regulated under the Endangered Species Act, there is now broad agreement that economic incentives are also needed for effective protection on private land (Rodrigues et al. 2011). A survey of North Carolina Farm Bureau county advisory board members in 93 of 100 North Carolina counties was conducted to determine how market-mechanism design influences interest in endangered species habitat conservation (Rodrigues et al. 2011). Respondents preferred contracts which received 57% of interest votes, over easements which received 39% of interest votes (Rodrigues et al. 2011). The study determined the preferred contract duration is ten years (Rodrigues et al. 2011). Term contracts may prove critical for endangered species conservation needs during a burning fire that require high levels of landowner support and spatial flexibility within relatively short time-frames.
Reference:
Rodriguez, Shari, M. Nils Peterson, Frederick W. Cubbage, Erin O. Sills and Howard D. Bondell. 2011. “Private Landowner Interest in Market-Based Incentive Programs for Endangered Species Habitat Conservation”. Wildlife Society Bulletin. 36(3): 469-476.
Comment by Fenton Kay:
Great response, Mary. Easements tend to be in perpetuity, whereas contracts have termination dates. What happens went the farmer leaves his wetlands alone and they develop a thriving ecosystem, then the market changes and the farmer decides that $$ are better than ducks?
My Comment:
Hi Fenton,
Great point. I would recommend the purchase-protect-resale (PPR) program which is used by conservation organizations in a number of countries to facilitate the protection of private land (Hardy et al. 2018). It’s essentially similar to a conservation easement but incorporates specific ideas about how to conduct transactions in a financially logical manner (Hardy et al. 2018). PPR approaches can be financially self-sustaining (Hardy et al. 2018). Identifying property types that meet conservation objectives and recover costs within a reasonable time frame, and drawing insights from economics to assist in decision making, could increase the effectiveness of PPR and improve conservation outcomes (Hardy et al. 2018).
There are two main ways to actualize PPR programs. One is to use a revolving fund to purchase private land with conservation value and then resell it to owners with a permanent conservation agreement attached to the property title (Hardy et al. 2018). Fund capital is replenished primarily by reselling purchased properties, ideally at prices that recover all purchase, transaction and ongoing costs, with replacement capital raised if needed (Hardy et al. 2018). The replenished capital is then used to purchase additional properties (Hardy et al. 2018). The second way to actualize PPR programs is to use a revolving loan fund whereby fund capital is distributed for the same purpose, either within a conservation organization (an internal revolving fund), or to a separate organization or individual (an external revolving fund), with an agreement for the borrower to return the money (often with low or zero interest) within a given time frame (Hardy et al. 2018). A general benefit of PPR is that it can be used to conserve expensive land and/or properties with high conservation value (Hardy et al. 2018). The program was stated as having particular benefit where voluntary protection or acquisition approaches were unlikely to be feasible, for example, where landowners had been unwilling to participate or where acquisition without resale was too expensive (Hardy et al. 2018). That said, a crucial benefit is its shifting of land ownership to conservation-minded owners (Hardy et al. 2018). PPR programs can minimize resale challenges by focusing on properties attractive to conservation-minded buyers and designing agreements that allow for some residential and recreational use while simultaneously protecting ecological value (Hardy et al. 2018).
Reference:
Hardy, Mathew J, James A Fitzsimons, Sarah A Bekessy and Ascelin Gordon. 2018. “Purchase, protect, resell, repeat: an effective process for conserving biodiversity on private land?”. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment. 16(6): 336-344.
Comment by Elizabeth Pagliuca:
Hello Mary,
I really liked how you related the library to private collections. The library is the city’s public system of knowledge but of course there are going to be private collections that assist in the protection of certain books. However these privatized protective departments can be questionable. The city pollution derived from human activity is part of the hardship facing the library and the public opinion of documentation systems. I agree with your point that if the policy design were different then there would be less of a need to prioritize species. I feel like a culture shift would be needed in order to change the policy design and fund the fire department or at least give them more men so they are not understaffed.